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Abstract
Th   e major task of a development-friendly international ﬁ  nancial architecture is to mitigate pro-
cyclical eﬀ  ects of ﬁ  nancial markets and open “policy space” for counter-cyclical macroeconomic 
policies in the developing world. Th   is paper explores a series of policy instruments for this purpose: 
counter-cyclical prudential regulatory and supervisory frameworks; market mechanisms that better 
distribute the risk faced by developing countries through the business cycle; multilateral instruments 
that encourage more stable private ﬂ  ows; and better provision of counter-cyclical oﬃ   cial liquidity. 
It also suggests that regional macroeconomic consultation, and common reserve funds or swap 
arrangements among developing countries can play a role in this regard.
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Th   e last three decades made developing countries, and particularly those more integrated into world ﬁ  nancial 
markets, swing at the rhythm of highly pro-cyclical external ﬁ  nancing. Financial volatility has a direct eﬀ  ect 
on the balance of payments and domestic ﬁ  nancial market, and through them on domestic economic activ-
ity and other macroeconomic variables. In the face of strong swings of private capital markets, developing 
countries lost “policy space” to adopt autonomous counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies, and faced dif-
ﬁ  cult challenges creating deep ﬁ  nancial markets. A vicious circle involving pro-cyclical ﬁ  nancing, incomplete 
ﬁ  nancial markets and institutions, and constraints to macroeconomic policy emerged: imperfect ﬁ  nancial 
markets have been a source of volatility, but deep ﬁ  nancial markets, improved ﬁ  nancial governance struc-
tures and counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies have been diﬃ   cult to develop in a highly volatile ﬁ  nancial 
environment (Fanelli, 2006). Th   e unfortunate outcome of this dynamics is that “twin” external and domestic 
ﬁ  nancial crises became far more frequent since the breakdown of Bretton Woods exchange rate arrangements 
(IMF, 1998; Bordo, et al., 2001).
Th   is paper thus argues forcefully that the major task of a development-friendly international ﬁ  nan-
cial architecture is to mitigate the pro-cyclical eﬀ  ects of ﬁ  nancial markets and open “policy space” for counter-
cyclical macroeconomic policies in the developing world. We look ﬁ  rst at features and costs of capital account 
volatility and the underlying international asymmetries, then at diﬀ  erent ways to reduce such volatility and 
open space for counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies.
Capital account volatility in the developing world
Trade and terms of trade ﬂ  uctuations play a major role in the determination of business cycles in developing 
countries, particularly in commodity-dependent economies. Domestic macroeconomic policies and political 
factors also play a role in determining business cycles. Since the 1970s, however, business cycles in develop-
ing countries have been characterized by the leading role played by capital account ﬂ  uctuations. Th   is has been 
particularly true for economies more integrated into world ﬁ  nancial markets, the “emerging economies”.
Boom-bust cycles reﬂ  ect investor herding and associated contagion –of both optimism and pes-
simism. Volatility is associated with signiﬁ  cant changes in risk evaluation, which involve the alternation of 
periods of “appetite for risk” (more precisely, underestimation of risks) with periods of a “ﬂ  ight to quality” 
(risk aversion). Market-sensitive risk management practices as well as other features of ﬁ  nancial markets (e.g. 
evaluation of managers against competitors) increase herding (Persaud, 2000). Furthermore, due to infor-
mation asymmetries, diﬀ  erent assets tend to be pooled together in risk categories that are viewed by market 
agents as being strongly correlated. Th   is practice turns such correlations into self-fulﬁ  lling prophecies.
Boom-bust cycles have given a renewed relevance to endogenous unstable dynamics of ﬁ  nancial 
markets analyzed by Minsky (1982), who emphasizes how ﬁ  nancial booms generate excessive risk taking by 
market agents, which eventually leads economies into crises. From a diﬀ  erent theoretical perspective, a simi-
lar explanation has been recently suggested by White (2006), who underscores how “search for yield” char-
1 Th   is paper was prepared for the CEDES/IDRC Project on “International Financial Architecture, Macro Volatility and 
Institutions: Th   e Developing Country Experience”. We are grateful to José María Fanelli and Jan Kregel for comments.2  DESA Working Paper No. 39
acteristic of low interest rate environments generates incentives for credit creation, carry trade and leverage 
that easily build up asset bubbles. “Th   e main risks to the ﬁ  nancial sector could stem from ﬁ  nancial excesses 
linked to a generalized complacency towards risk reinforced by a benign short-term outlook” (BIS, 2005: 
120). A low inﬂ  ation environment may actually encourage such behaviour, as monetary policy tends to be 
accommodative and may even (according to inﬂ  uential views, such as those of Alan Greenspan) be powerless 
in the face of asset price bubbles, although it can later mitigate eﬀ  ects of asset price busting. Th   is was evident 
in Japan in the 1990s as well as the US in the 2000s.
In developing countries, ﬂ  uctuations in capital markets are reﬂ  ected in the pro-cyclical pattern of 
spreads, variations in the availability of ﬁ  nancing (absence or presence of credit rationing) and in maturities. 
Th   is involves short-term volatility, such as very intense upward movement of spreads and the short periods 
of interruption (rationing) of ﬁ  nancing observed during the Mexican, Asian and the Russian crises. More 
importantly, they also involve medium-term cycles, as the experience of the past three decades indicates (see 
Figure 1 in relation to spreads since 1994). During this period, two full medium-term cycles were experi-
enced: a boom of external ﬁ  nancing in the 1970s, followed by a major debt crisis in the 1980s; a new boom 
in the 1990s, followed by a sharp reduction in net ﬂ  ows after the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-98. Since 
2002-03 a new such cycle has been in place, which already underwent a phase of turbulence in May/June 
2006.
Interestingly, as Figure 1 also indicates, ﬂ  uctuations in risk premia for emerging markets tend to cor-
relate with spreads of US high-yield bonds. Th   us, the pro-cyclicality of ﬁ  nancial markets aﬀ  ects all types of 
assets considered risky by market agents. Th   e correlation is imperfect, though, reﬂ  ecting speciﬁ  c factors that 
determine diﬀ  erent asset classes.
Diﬀ  erent types of capital ﬂ  ows show diﬀ  erent volatility patterns. Th   e higher volatility of short-term 
capital indicates reliance on such ﬁ  nancing is highly risky (Rodrik and Velasco, 2000), whereas the smaller 
volatility of FDI vis-à-vis all 
forms of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows is consid-
ered a source of strength. How-
ever, “ﬁ  nancial engineering” may 
be making diﬀ  erent ﬂ  ows increas-
ingly similar. Particularly, the use 
of risk management techniques 
by multinationals, via derivatives, 
may make FDI in critical mo-
ments as volatile as traditional 
ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows.
Volatility in ﬁ  nancial 
markets is partly transmitted to 
developing countries through 
public-sector accounts, especially 
through eﬀ  ects of the availabil-
ity of ﬁ  nancing on government 
spending, and of interest rates on 
public sector debt service pay-
Figure 1.






















































Sources: ECLAC, on the basis of data from Merrill Lynch’s U.S. High-Yield Master II 
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ments. In commodity-dependent developing countries, links between availability of ﬁ  nancing and com-
modity prices reinforce the eﬀ  ects on public sector accounts. However, the most important eﬀ  ects of capital-
account ﬂ  uctuations are on private spending and balance sheets. Capital-account cycles, their domestic 
ﬁ  nancial multipliers and their reﬂ  ection in asset prices have thus become the major determinant of growth 
volatility in the developing world, whereas price and wage rigidities emphasized in the “neo-classical synthe-
sis” have played a rather secondary or even insigniﬁ  cant role (Easterly, et al., 2001).
During booms, developing countries viewed by markets as “success” stories are almost inevitably 
drawn into the capital account boom, inducing private-sector deﬁ  cits and risky balance sheets (Ffrench-Dav-
is, 2001; Marfán, 2005). However, even countries with weak “fundamentals” may be drawn into the boom 
(see, for example, Calvo, et al. 1993) and all countries, again with some independence from their “funda-
mentals”, will be drawn into “sudden stops” of external ﬁ  nancing (Calvo and Talvi, 2004). What market 
judges as “success stories” during booms and “pariahs” during crises may also be subject to cyclical variations. 
Notice, for example, the transformation of Argentina from “success story” to pariah of ﬁ  nancial markets, and 
the converse evolution of Russia since 1998. Th   is means that the concept of “macroeconomic fundamentals” 
and, particularly, the market evaluation of such “fundamentals” must be taken with a grain of salt. However, 
some objective macroeconomic factors do help to determine vulnerability to crises, particularly large current 
account imbalances and weak ﬁ  nancial sectors.
Conditions are particularly diﬃ   cult in developing countries during crises, because rising risk pre-
miums and reduced availability of external ﬁ  nancing may eliminate the room for counter-cyclical monetary 
and ﬁ  scal policies, and may rather force them to adopt pro-cyclical policies—i.e., high interest rates and 
tight ﬁ  scal policies. Th   us, while industrial countries can smooth pro-cyclical eﬀ  ects of credit and asset prices 
through counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies, developing countries may be forced to adopt pro-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies that reinforce the pro-cyclical movements of ﬁ  nancial markets. Indeed, the “credibil-
ity” of authorities to ﬁ  nancial market agents during crises will be judged according to their capacity to adopt 
austerity policies. Interaction between increases in country risk premia and reduced availability of ﬁ  nancing 
during crises can be particularly destabilizing in economies with high debt ratios (Frenkel, 2005).
Th   ere is also widespread evidence that ample private sector ﬁ  nancing encourages pro-cyclical mac-
roeconomic policies during booms. Austerity policies during crises may generate a political economy bias 
toward expansion when ﬁ  nancing becomes again available. In turn, ample private sector ﬁ  nancing encour-
ages pro-cyclical responses from markets and macroeconomic authorities. Th   us, unstable external ﬁ  nancing 
distorts incentives that both private agents and authorities face throughout the business cycle, inducing a 
pro-cyclical behaviour of economic agents and macroeconomic policies (Kamisky, et al., 2004; United Na-
tions, 2006). In the words of Stiglitz (2003), increased exposure to ﬁ  nancial market risks replaced Keynesian 
automatic stabilizers with automatic de-stabilizers. Contrary to the view that, with liberalization, ﬁ  nancial 
markets would play a disciplining role, dependence on ﬁ  nancial swings encouraged adoption of pro-cyclical 
monetary and ﬁ  scal policies that increased both real macroeconomic instability and the alternation of ﬁ  nan-
cial euphoria and crises.
Crises are deleterious for ﬁ  nancial development and institution building, as they destroy the “rules of 
the game” for ﬁ  nancial transactions and it takes time to build new rules. Th   ey also generate endogenous re-
sponses in ﬁ  nancial structures that contribute to volatility: shallow markets for long-term instruments, miss-
ing markets for risk transactions, market segmentation, liquidity constraints for many market agents and, in 
some cases, dollar/euroization (Fanelli, 2006). Some of the most important eﬀ  ects are the endemic maturity 4  DESA Working Paper No. 39
and currency mismatches that characterize balance sheets of economic agents in developing countries. Ma-
turity and currency risks are accumulated during periods of ﬁ  nancial euphoria; thus, the sharp reduction in 
liquidity, increased domestic interest rates and exchange rate depreciations during crises has strong balance 
sheet eﬀ  ects.
Although pro-cyclicality is inherent in ﬁ  nancial markets, domestic ﬁ  nancial and capital account liber-
alization in the developing world have accentuated its eﬀ  ects. A lag in developing adequate prudential regula-
tion and supervision frameworks increases the risks of ﬁ  nancial liberalization. Th   e development of appropri-
ate ﬁ  nancial governance structures is itself made diﬃ   cult in volatile ﬁ  nancial environments, and they only 
help to mitigate (i.e., they do not eliminate) the increased volatility that ﬁ  nancial liberalization generates.
Th   e costs of such ﬁ  nancial volatility in the developing world in terms of economic growth are high. 
Th   ere is now overwhelming evidence that pro-cyclical ﬁ  nancial markets and macroeconomic policies have 
increased growth volatility and have not encouraged growth in the developing world (Prasad et al., 2003). 
Whatever the eﬃ   ciency gains from ﬁ  nancial market integration, they are swamped by the negative eﬀ  ects of 
growth volatility.
Eichengreen (2004) estimated that over the past 25 years, income of developing countries had been 
25 per cent lower due to currency and banking crises. Others have estimated even higher average annual 
costs of crises. Indonesia experienced larger falls in output and incomes during the Asian crisis than the 
United States during the Great Depression. In the presence of increasing returns, such strong recessions gen-
erate cumulative eﬀ  ects (Easterly, 2001: chapter 10). In the most adverse cases, it will lead to a displacement 
in the long-term growth trajectory (e.g., most Latin American countries in the 1980s, or Indonesia since the 
Asian crisis).
Each medium term ﬁ  nancial cycle may have speciﬁ  c features. Th   e current one has been character-
ized by an unprecedented accumulation of international reserves and reduced debt ratios—“self-insurance” 
against the ﬁ  nancial instability experienced during previous crises. Such “self-insurance”, together with 
booming exports and the rapid development of local currency bond markets (see below), may have changed 
conditions surrounding developing country ﬁ  nancing in recent years.
However, new risks have emerged or become more prominent. First, increased dependence of devel-
oping countries on export-led strategies and on high commodity prices have made them more vulnerable to 
trade cycles. Th   e interaction between trade and capital account ﬂ  uctuations has been a traditional source of 
vulnerability, but may be assuming new dimensions given higher openness of most developing countries.
Second, new sources of potential pro-cyclicality have emerged, particularly related to the explosive 
growth of derivatives worldwide. In developing economies, derivative contracts are being used both as instru-
ments to hedge risk and for international hedge funds and investment banks to speculate, for example via the 
“carry trade”. Large parts of these derivative markets are not regulated (as they operate in the OTC market 
and oﬀ  -shore). Nor have existing regulations fully incorporated the risks that derivatives pose in situations of 
stress, when they can add to systemic risk.
Th   ird, uncertainties associated with the risk of a disorderly unravelling of global imbalances may 
drastically change the prospect for developing economies. A major paradox is that measures of “self-insur-
ance” of developing countries (large current account surpluses, increased international reserves and reduced A counter-cyclical framework for a development-friendly IFA          5
indebtedness) are also part of global imbalances. Th   e new sources of strength of developing countries, when 
viewed on a country-by-country basis, turn out to be one of the elements of vulnerability for developing 
countries as a whole. A global co-operative approach to provision of “collective insurance” and management 
of global imbalances would thus be a more desirable solution (Ocampo, Kregel and Griﬃ   th-Jones, 2006: 
chapter IV).
Implications of ﬁ  nancial volatility for international cooperation
Th   e underlying ﬁ  nancial and macroeconomic asymmetries
Th   e dynamics of boom-bust cycles is deeply rooted in the operation of ﬁ  nancial markets, and in basic asym-
metries that characterize the world economy (Ocampo and Martin, 2003). In the ﬁ  nancial area, such asym-
metries are reﬂ  ected in: (i) incapacity of most developing countries to issue liabilities in international markets 
in their own currencies, a phenomenon referred to as “original sin” (Eichengreen, et al., 2003; Hausman 
and Panizza, 2003), partly mitigated by recent growth of local currency debt markets; (ii) diﬀ  erences in the 
degree of domestic ﬁ  nancial and capital market development, which lead to an under-supply of long-term 
ﬁ  nancial instruments; and (iii) the small size of developing countries’ domestic ﬁ  nancial markets vis-à-vis the 
magnitude of speculative pressures they may face. Th   is implies that domestic ﬁ  nancial markets in the devel-
oping world are signiﬁ  cantly more “incomplete” than in the industrial world and thus that some ﬁ  nancial 
intermediation must be conducted through international markets. Developing countries are plagued with 
a myriad of ﬁ  nancial market imperfections, particularly by variable mixes of currency and maturity mis-
matches. Financial asymmetries generate, in turn, important macroeconomic asymmetries, particularly in the 
capacity of developing countries to undertake counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies.
Th   e risks associated with ﬁ  nancial instability can be partly corrected by domestic policy actions, 
involving variable mixes of foreign exchange reserve accumulation during booms, counter-cyclical ﬁ  scal poli-
cies, strengthened prudential regulation and supervision, and variable mixes of exchange rate intervention, 
management of the capital account (including through incentives to reduce debt or improve its term struc-
ture during booms) and use of the margins for counter-cyclical monetary policy that those policies generate 
(Ocampo, 2005).
However, such actions are not costless. Th   us, the accumulation of international reserves to cover 
risks associated with short-term capital is usually expensive. Th   e risks faced by the domestic ﬁ  nancial sector 
can be counterbalanced by stricter prudential regulations but this raises the cost of ﬁ  nancial intermedia-
tion and may restrict the development of new ﬁ  nancial services. Furthermore, many regulatory actions that 
emerging economies can adopt to manage risks merely shift rather than correct the underlying risks.
Th   e public sector (including the central bank) can also act as the “insurer of last resort” of private 
sector risks, through the issue of foreign currency denominated bonds that the private sector can use to cover 
its currency mismatches. Although this may help the private sector to absorb shocks, it implies additional 
public sector liabilities and, possibly, a larger tax burden to service them. Th   e Brazilian experience provides 
the best example of the potential costs of such risk absorption strategy (Souza, Silveira and Carvalho, 2006).
Th   ere is a profound sense in which ﬁ  nancial and macroeconomic asymmetries that aﬀ  ect developing 
countries are inescapable. Th   e search for shortcuts and “silver bullets” (hard pegs or the adoption of interna-
tional currencies) does not eliminate the diﬃ   cult tradeoﬀ  s that such asymmetries generate.6  DESA Working Paper No. 39
Implications for the design of the international ﬁ  nancial architecture
Th   e wave of crises in the developing world has underscored the need for a broad framework for macroeco-
nomic stability. In the recent debate, this has been reﬂ  ected in the focus on sustainability, including external, 
ﬁ  scal and ﬁ  nancial sector sustainability (IMF, 2004). But given the pro-cyclical bias of ﬁ  nancial markets and 
the strong incentives to adopt pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies, an equally important emphasis should be 
given to the counter-cyclical dimensions of macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial policies.
Th   e counter-cyclical dimensions have received much less attention in recent debates. Th   is is reﬂ  ected 
in the absence of this concept in the new IMF Medium-Term Framework (IMF, 2005a). Th   is contrasts with 
the importance this concept played in past macroeconomic debates and the explicitly counter-cyclical focus 
of macroeconomic policies in some industrial economies, particularly the United States. It is also in contrast 
with the call by the major grouping in developing countries in ﬁ  nancial issues, the Group of 24 (2005), to 
include explicit counter-cyclical objectives in the IMF’s support to developing countries. In this area, there 
is an increasing consensus on the need to use expansionary periods to strengthen ﬁ  scal positions, and a more 
limited recognition of the need to avoid explicitly pro-cyclical ﬁ  scal policies during crises (such as targeting 
the current deﬁ  cit in a context in which tax revenues are declining). However, this represents only a very 
limited recognition of the need to fully mainstream counter-cyclical concerns in designing macroeconomic 
frameworks.
It has also become increasingly recognized that liberalized capital accounts and ﬁ  nancial markets 
generate excessively risky private sector balance sheets, and that excessive reliance on short-term external 
ﬁ  nancing enhances the risk of currency crises. Preventive (prudential) macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial policies, 
which aim at avoiding the accumulation of unsustainable public and private sector debts and balance sheets 
during periods of ﬁ  nancial euphoria, have thus become part of the standard recipe. However, even well-
established counter-cyclical prudential practices, such as the Spanish system of forward-looking provisions, 
have received limited attention, and the need to reduce pro-cyclicality was not given adequate attention in 
the revision of Basle standards. Rather, Basle II may increase pro-cyclicality of both international and domes-
tic bank lending.
Managing counter-cyclical policies for developing countries in the current globalized ﬁ  nancial world 
is, of course, no easy task, as ﬁ  nancial markets generate strong incentives to adopt pro-cyclical policies and 
reduce the room of manoeuvre to undertake counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. It is thus essential that 
international cooperation in the macroeconomic policy area be designed to overcome such incentives and 
constraints.
Th   is means that the ﬁ  rst role of international ﬁ  nancial institutions, from the point of view of de-
veloping countries, is to mitigate the pro-cyclical eﬀ  ects of ﬁ  nancial markets and open “policy space” for counter-
cyclical macroeconomic policies. Th   is can be achieved by: (i) smoothing out boom-bust cycles at the source 
through regulation; (ii) helping partially cover or diversify the risks (especially of a cyclical nature) develop-
ing countries face in international capital markets; and (iii) increasing incentives and degrees of freedom that 
developing countries have to adopt counter-cyclical policies.
A number of measures can be suggested. Th   ey include: (i) explicit introduction of counter-cyclical 
criteria in the design of prudential regulatory and supervisory frameworks, in capital source and develop-
ing countries; (ii) designing market mechanisms that better distribute the risk faced by developing countries A counter-cyclical framework for a development-friendly IFA          7
throughout the business cycle (GDP indexed and local currency bonds); (iii) instruments that encourage 
more stable private ﬂ  ows, such as counter-cyclical guarantees; and (iv) counter-cyclical oﬃ   cial liquidity to 
deal with external shocks. Since the design of a development-friendly international ﬁ  nancial architecture 
should include not only global but also a complete network of regional institutions, we examine cooperation 
among developing countries.
Counter-cyclical prudential regulation and supervision
Th   e origins of problems that erupt during ﬁ  nancial crises are associated with both excessive risk-taking dur-
ing booms and the inevitable mix of maturity and currency mismatches that characterize balance sheets in 
developing countries. Inadequate risk analysis by ﬁ  nancial agents and weak prudential regulation of domestic 
ﬁ  nancial systems exacerbate this. However, even well-regulated systems in industrial countries are subject to 
periodic episodes when risks are underestimated. In Argentina, a system of prudential regulations considered 
to be one of the best in the developing world—and with large-scale presence of multinational banks—failed 
to avert eﬀ  ects of major macroeconomic shocks on the domestic ﬁ  nancial system.
One of the major problems seems to be the focus of prudential regulation on microeconomic risks, 
and the tendency to underestimate risks that have a clear macroeconomic origin.2 Whereas microeconomic 
risk management can reduce risks that depend on individual characteristics of each borrower through diversi-
ﬁ  cation, they cannot reduce systematic risks, associated, for example, with business cycles. Th   e basic problem 
in this regard is the inability of individual ﬁ  nancial intermediaries to internalize collective risks assumed 
during boom periods.
Moreover, traditional regulatory tools, including both Basle I and Basle II standards, have a pro-
cyclical bias. Th   e basic problem is the highly pro-cyclical nature of a system in which loan-loss provisions are 
tied to loan delinquency or to short-term expectations of future loan losses. Such system may be ineﬀ  ective 
in hampering excessive risk-taking during booms, when expectations of loan losses are low, thus eﬀ  ectively 
underestimating risks and the counterpart provisions for loan-losses. Th   e sharp increase in loan delinquency 
during crises reduces ﬁ  nancial institutions’ capital and, hence, their lending capacity, potentially triggering 
a “credit squeeze”; this would reinforce the downswing in economic activity and asset prices and, thus, the 
quality of the portfolios of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. Since credit ratings are also pro-cyclical, basing risk on 
such ratings is also pro-cyclical.
Given the central role all these processes play in business cycles of developing countries, and the 
important inﬂ  uence of banking regulation on credit availability in the modern economy, the crucial issue is 
to introduce a counter-cyclical element into prudential regulation and supervision. Th   e major innovation 
is the Spanish system of forward-looking provisions, introduced in 2000 and modiﬁ  ed in 2005, and later 
adopted by Portugal. According to this system, provisions are made when loans are disbursed based on the 
expected losses (“latent risks”), estimated on the basis of a full business cycle (Fernández de Lis, et al., 2001). 
Th   is system implies that provisioning follows the criteria traditionally used by the insurance industry, where 
provisions are made when the insurance policy is issued.
Under this system, provisions build up during economic expansions and are drawn upon during 
downturns. Th   ey are accumulated in a fund, which is used to cover loan losses. Although the accumulation 
2  For recent analyses of these issues and policy options for managing them, see BIS (2001: chapter 7) and Ocampo 
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and drawing down of the fund has a counter-cyclical dynamic, this only reﬂ  ects the cyclical pattern of bank 
lending. Th   us, the system is, strictly speaking, “cycle-neutral”. It can be complemented by strictly counter-
cyclical prudential provisions, which can be decreed by the regulatory authority for the ﬁ  nancial system as 
a whole or for some ﬁ  nancial agents on the basis of the excessive growth of credit (relative to some bench-
mark), the bias in lending to sectors characterized by systematic risks and the growth of foreign-currency 
denominated loans to non-tradable sectors.
Th   e explicit analysis of the counter-cyclical elements of prudential regulation and supervision should 
thus become a central concern of the Basle Committee. Th  e  beneﬁ  ts to developing countries would accrue 
through both a less pro-cyclical supply of credit and more resilient domestic ﬁ  nancial systems.
Ensuring a more precise measurement of risk in bank portfolios should also be the subject of atten-
tion in drafting international accounting standards. Indeed, existing standards give no room for concepts 
such as the “latent risks” in bank portfolios, leading to both an overestimation of their “fair value” during 
periods of euphoria and an underestimation during phases of excessive pessimism. Th   e tax system should also 
accept such transparent provisions as ﬁ  scal costs.
In developing countries these provisions should be supplemented by more speciﬁ  c regulations aimed 
at controlling currency and maturity mismatches (including those associated with derivative operations), 
and at avoiding the overvaluation of collateral generated by asset price bubbles. Th   e strict prohibition of 
currency mismatches in the portfolios of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries is the best rule, but authorities should also 
closely monitor currency risk of non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms operating in non-tradable sectors, which may become 
credit risks for banks. Regulations can be used to establish higher provisions and/or risk weighting for these 
operations, or a strict prohibition on lending in foreign currencies to non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms without revenues in 
those currencies.
Moreover, many regulatory practices aimed at correcting risky practices shift underlying risks to 
non-ﬁ  nancial agents. Th   us, for example, lower risk ratings for short-term credit and strong liquidity require-
ments reduce direct banking risks, but also reinforce the short-term bias in lending. Maturity mismatches are 
thus displaced to non-ﬁ  nancial agents and may result in reduced ﬁ  xed capital investment. Also, prudential 
regulations forbidding banks from holding currency mismatches in their portfolios may encourage non-
ﬁ  nancial agents to borrow directly from abroad. Reduced direct vulnerability of the domestic ﬁ  nancial sector 
will have, as a corollary, the currency and, possibly, maturity mismatches of non-ﬁ  nancial agents. Th   is is why 
capital account regulations aimed at avoiding inadequate maturity structure of borrowing in external markets 
by all domestic agents, and at avoiding currency mismatches in the portfolios of those agents operating in 
non-tradable sectors, may be the best available option (Ocampo, 2003). Also, as long as there is no interna-
tional lender of last resort, international rules should continue to provide room for the use of capital account 
regulation by developing countries.
Th   e evaluation of the vulnerability of domestic ﬁ  nancial system as well as the development of regula-
tory and supervisory frameworks have become essential elements of ﬁ  nancial sector assessments undertaken 
by the IMF and the World Bank. It is essential that the macroeconomic and, particularly, the counter-
cyclical dimensions of prudential regulation and supervision be equally and routinely incorporated in such 
assessments and advice.A counter-cyclical framework for a development-friendly IFA          9
In addition, Basle II has a number of problems that require attention: it is complex where it should 
be simple; it is implicitly pro-cyclical when it should be explicitly counter-cyclical; and although it is sup-
posed to more accurately align regulatory capital to the risks that banks face, in the case of lending to 
developing countries it ignores the proved beneﬁ  ts of diversiﬁ  cation. In particular, by failing to take account 
of the beneﬁ  ts of international diversiﬁ  cation of portfolios, capital requirements for loans to developing 
countries will be signiﬁ  cantly higher than is justiﬁ  ed on the basis of the actual risks attached to such lending. 
Th   ere are thus fears that Basel II creates the risk of a sharp reduction in bank lending to developing coun-
tries, particularly during crises (thus enhancing the pro-cyclicality of such lending), and of an increase in the 
cost of a signiﬁ  cant part of the remaining lending, particularly for low-rated borrowing countries.
One clear way in which Basle II could be improved to reduce these problems would be to introduce 
the beneﬁ  ts of diversiﬁ  cation into the internal-ratings based approach. One of the major beneﬁ  ts of invest-
ing in developing and emerging economies is their relatively low correlation with mature markets. Th  is  has 
been tested empirically using a wide variety of ﬁ  nancial, market and macro variables. Diﬀ  erent simulations 
that compared estimated losses of portfolios that were diversiﬁ  ed across both developed and developing 
countries with the losses of portfolios in developed countries only, indicate that the former were from 19 to 
23 per cent lower (Griﬃ   th-Jones, Segoviano and Spratt, 2004). If risks are measured precisely, this should be 
reﬂ  ected in lower capital requirements.
An additional positive eﬀ  ect of taking account of the beneﬁ  ts of diversiﬁ  cation is that this makes 
capital requirements far less pro-cyclical than otherwise. Indeed, if the beneﬁ  ts of diversiﬁ  cation are incorpo-
rated, simulations show that the variance over time of capital requirements will be signiﬁ  cantly smaller than 
if they are not.
Market instruments
GDP-linked bonds
GDP-linked bonds could be particularly beneﬁ  cial to smooth debt service payments by linking part of the 
annual debt servicing of the bond to the growth of the debtor country’s GDP growth (Griﬃ   th-Jones and 
Sharma, 2006). Th   e interest coupon would be totally or partially tied to the issuing country’s rate of growth. 
Given the requirement for many institutional investors to hold assets that pay a positive interest rate, a ﬂ  oor 
can be determined beyond which the coupon rate cannot fall.
GDP-indexed bonds could be beneﬁ  cial for all countries, but especially for developing ones. Th  ey 
would provide two major beneﬁ  ts for them. First, they stabilize government spending and limit the pro-
cyclicality of ﬁ  scal pressures by requiring smaller interest payments at times of slower growth –thus provid-
ing space for higher spending or lower taxes during crises. Th   ey also curb excessively expansionary policy in 
times of rapid growth. Th   e issuance of such bonds would make it easier for governments to follow counter-
cyclical ﬁ  scal policies. Second, by allowing debt service ratios to fall in times of slow or negative growth, they 
reduce the likelihood of defaults and debt crisis.
Simulations indicate that gains for emerging-economy borrowers can be substantial. Research by 
Borensztein and Mauro (2004) shows that if half of Mexico’s government debt consisted of GDP-indexed 
bonds, it would have saved interest payments equivalent to about 1.6 per cent of GDP during the Tequila 
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To help create a market for these instruments, it may be better if they were issued ﬁ  rst by countries 
with greater credibility. Two such groups of countries can be identiﬁ  ed. Th  e  ﬁ  rst are developed countries. 
Th   e second are developing countries, like Mexico or Chile, that are attractive to markets. Th   e precedent of 
introducing collective action clauses into bonds, done ﬁ  rst by developed countries and later followed by 
developing ones, shows that demonstration eﬀ  ects can be very eﬀ  ective for introducing ﬁ  nancial innovations. 
Positive precedents—e.g., by investors with Argentine warrants that provide an upside of debt servicing if 
growth is above a ﬁ  xed level—also create a propitious climate for them.
GDP-indexed bonds may also provide beneﬁ  ts for issuer industrialized countries, especially in 
Europe. Th   ey may be particularly attractive for EMU countries, given that the “Stability and Growth Pact” 
tends to render their ﬁ  scal policies pro-cyclical if their structural ﬁ  scal position is not too distant from the 
maximum allowed deﬁ  cit (3 per cent of GDP). Th   ey are also particularly relevant for European countries 
where pensions are indexed against GDP growth, such as Italy.
Investors are likely to receive two main beneﬁ  ts from the introduction of GDP-linked bonds. First, 
they would provide an opportunity to take a position on countries’ future growth prospects. Th   ough this is 
possible to some degree through stock markets, these are often not representative of the economy as a whole. 
Since growth rates across emerging markets tend to be fairly uncorrelated, a portfolio including GDP-
indexed bonds for several of these economies would have the beneﬁ  ts of diversiﬁ  cation, thus increasing the 
return/risk ratio. Second, investors would beneﬁ  t from a lower frequency of defaults and ﬁ  nancial crises, 
which often results in costly litigations/renegotiation and sometimes in outright losses.
On a broader level, GDP-indexed bonds can be viewed as desirable vehicles for international 
risk-sharing, as a way of avoiding the disruptions from formal defaults and as a mechanism to help smooth 
growth. Th   ey have the characteristic of a public good as they generate systemic beneﬁ  ts above those going to 
individual investors and issuing countries.
Th   ese externalities provide a justiﬁ  cation for some public action to help create such a market. Th  us, 
the World Bank and regional development banks could play the role of “market makers” for GDP-linked 
bonds (Ocampo, Kregel and Griﬃ   th-Jones, 2006: Chapter 2). Th   ese institutions could begin by develop-
ing a portfolio of loans, the repayments of which could be indexed to the growth rate of the debtor country. 
Once they have a portfolio of such loans to diﬀ  erent developing countries, they could securitize them and 
sell them in the international capital markets. Such a portfolio could be particularly attractive for private 
investors as it would oﬀ  er them the opportunity of taking a position on the growth prospects of a number of 
emerging economies simultaneously. As correlations among growth rates of developing countries tend to be 
lower at the global level, the World Bank may be best placed to do such securitization. One disadvantage of 
GDP-linked bonds is that developing countries’ ability to pay is not only associated with GDP growth but 
also with the ability to generate a suﬃ   cient supply of foreign exchange, and thus with the evolution of the 
real exchange rate. To the extent that ﬂ  uctuations of this variable are pro-cyclical, real exchange rate volatility 
will compound GDP ﬂ  uctuations. Th   ese instruments could be eventually indexed to GDP measured in the 
currency of issuance of the bonds, but this may reduce their attractiveness.
But perhaps the main concern for developing a GDP-linked bond market is uncertainty about their 
future liquidity. Th   is has been a problem for issuing other new instruments such as inﬂ  ation-indexed bonds. 
However, such problems have been overcome once such paper was issued on a signiﬁ  cant scale.A counter-cyclical framework for a development-friendly IFA          11
Local Currency Bonds
Another alternative for better managing the risks faced by developing countries throughout the business 
cycle consists of the introduction of local currency-denominated bonds. Th   ese bonds oﬀ  er a cure against the 
currency mismatches that characterize the debt structure of developing countries. At the domestic level, the 
development of domestic capital markets, especially bond markets, also creates a more stable source of local 
funding for both the public and private sectors, mitigating diﬃ   culties created by sudden stops in cross-bor-
der capital ﬂ  ows.
Th   e recognition of their virtues has been reﬂ  ected in a boom of domestic bond markets in develop-
ing countries since the Asian crisis (see Figure 2). Th  e  ﬁ  nancial infrastructure required to provide adequate 
liquidity involves adequate regulation, well-structured stock and bond markets—with bonds usually pro-
viding a larger market in most countries—and investment banks which play the role of “market makers” 
to help provide liquidity. Th   ere is also growing attention to issuing local currency denominated bonds in 
international markets, but these instruments still represent a small though growing share of the market. As 
the experience of those countries that have been more successful in issuing these bonds indicates (e.g., South 
Africa), they are largely used to cover the currency risks of long-term investors.
Domestic markets for these instruments also tend to be less liquid than similar markets in industrial 
countries, and the reduction of currency mismatches comes at the cost of additional maturity mismatches 
(Jeanneau and Tovar, 2006). For international investors, the attractiveness of these instruments depends 
on expectations of exchange rate appreciation, and their demand may thus be subject to strong pro-cyclical 
swings. Th   e advantages in terms of reduced currency mismatches for developing country issuers may thus 
not be accompanied by reduced volatility of external capital ﬂ  ows. Th   is may lead, in turn, to a stronger link 
between exchange rate expectations and domestic interest rates. Minimum holding periods for the associated 
funds or exit taxes may thus be useful to get the full beneﬁ  ts from diversifying the currency risks but may 
reduce their attractiveness for international investors and the liquidity of these instruments.
Innovative proposals have 
been advanced to make local cur-
rency investments more attractive 
on a stable basis by international 
investors. Dodd and Spiegel 
(2005) have suggested raising 
capital in international markets 
by forming diversiﬁ  ed portfolios 
of emerging market local currency 
debt issued by sovereign Govern-
ments. Th   ese portfolios would—
by using risk management 
techniques of diversiﬁ  cation—
generate a return-to-risk that 
competed favourably with other 
major capital market security 
indices. A portfolio of emerging 
market local currency debt can 
Figure 2.
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raise rates of return relative to risk that compete with those of major US and European securities indices in 
international capital markets.
A similar eﬀ  ect could be achieved by multilateral development banks raising funds in the local mar-
kets of developing countries. Th   e World Bank and the regional development banks could also design pilot 
projects of diversiﬁ  ed bond issues that would provide information on returns, risk, and prices that could 
encourage private agents to emulate. Th   e second Asian Bond Fund (ABF2) launched in December 2004 by 
the eleven EMEAP (Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Paciﬁ  c Central Banks) is a pilot project of this type. All 
central banks invested in bonds denominated in domestic currencies of the eight EMEAP emerging econo-
mies.3
Counter-cyclical guarantee facilities
It is widely accepted that international ﬁ  nancial markets overestimate risk in diﬃ   cult times and underesti-
mate it in good times. Private lenders’ resulting boom-bust patterns are often more determined by changing 
global risk appetite and/or contagion rather than by country fundamentals. Th   is provides a strong case for 
public institutions to play an explicit counter-cyclical role to help compensate for the inherent tendency of 
private ﬂ  ows to be pro-cyclical. Th   is is widely recognized in lending by IMF but applies equally to multilat-
eral development banks (MDBs) and export credit agencies (ECAs). A particular case is guarantees for long-
term trade credit for infrastructure investment. Indeed, private investment in infrastructure that had grown 
signiﬁ  cantly during the early and mid-1990s, fell sharply in the wake of the numerous crises (Griﬃ   th-Jones 
and Fuzzo de Lima, 2006).
Th   ere could be two paths for increasing the counter-cyclical role of international ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions in this area. One would be for MDBs to provide more counter-cyclical lending than already occurs 
(e.g., in infrastructure). Another path, which could provide more leverage of the public resources they man-
age, would be for MDBs and ECAs to be more active in issuing guarantees to private sector lenders with an 
explicit counter-cyclical element in the associated risk evaluations. Th   is requires MDBs and ECAs to assess 
risk for issuing guarantees with a longer term perspective than typically done by commercial banks; when 
banks or other lenders lowered their exposure to a country, MDBs or ECAs would increase their level of 
guarantees if they considered that the country’s long-term fundamentals were basically sound. When market 
risk evaluations improve and the willingness to lend increased, MDBs or ECAs could decrease their expo-
sure.
To the extent that MDBs and ECAs increasingly use models to assess risks, taking a longer-term 
view would require the use of models with a longer-term perspective than those used by private lenders. 
Th   ese models would be presumably better at “seeing through the cycle”, using more measures of risk focused 
on long-term factors.
It is important that guarantees should be tailor-made to correct market imperfections and avoid 
moral hazard. Otherwise, they might undermine the initiatives to enhance private capital ﬂ  ows to developing 
countries. First, they must maintain the private investors’ incentives to choose only good projects—to avoid 
adverse selection —and run them eﬃ   ciently. Second, guarantees can impose excessive costs on taxpayers or 
consumers and expose them to too much risk. To overcome this, it is crucial that contingent liabilities of 
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guarantees be carefully monitored and their risks assessed. Furthermore, in the case of infrastructure projects, 
the risks to be guaranteed have to be carefully deﬁ  ned in such a way that private agents assume normal mar-
ket risks (which can be subject, however, to some counter-cyclical evaluation), whereas non-market risks (such 
as regulatory risk or force majeur) should be subject to greater attention by authorities granting guarantees.
An alternative to mitigate risks is to push forward regional eﬀ  orts to create guarantee agencies that 
enable risk sharing among countries that have common interests, including infrastructure development in 
neighbouring economies. Th   is could enhance the creditworthiness of single country members and therefore 
of their government guarantees, especially in diﬃ   cult times.
Th   is innovation could count with technical assistance of regional or sub-regional development 
banks. A sovereign guarantee pool could be developed as a contractual mechanism for risk sharing among 
governments that beneﬁ  t from the same infrastructure project but have diﬀ  erent credit ratings. Th  e  country 
with the higher rating could have an interest in having the project funded via this mechanism, due to posi-
tive externalities derived from the project. Th   e lower rated country could compensate the guarantee coverage 
provided by its higher rated partner.
The provision of counter-cyclical ofﬁ  cial liquidity
For capital-account-led crises
At the country level, central banks have acted for many decades as lenders of last resort to prevent ﬁ  nancial 
crises and their deepening when they occur. Equivalent international mechanisms are still at an embryonic 
stage, with the current IMF arrangements operating more under the principle of the “emergency ﬁ  nancier”, 
since there is no automaticity in the availability of ﬁ  nancing during crises (Griﬃ   th-Jones and Ocampo, 
2003). Enhanced provision of emergency ﬁ  nancing at the international level in response to external shocks 
is essential to lowering unnecessary burdens of adjustment, and to avoid the spread of crises. Appropriate 
facilities should include a liquidity provision to cover large capital ﬂ  ow reversals and volatility in real export 
earnings.
In recent decades, capital-account liberalization and large capital-account volatility greatly increased 
the need for oﬃ   cial liquidity to deal with large reversals in capital ﬂ  ows. Th   ere is increasing consensus that 
many of the recent crises in emerging markets have been triggered by self-fulﬁ  lling liquidity runs (see, for in-
stance, Hausmann and Velasco, 2004; see also the case studies in this project). Indeed, capital outﬂ  ows could 
be provoked by many factors not related to countries’ policies.
Th   e enhanced provision of emergency ﬁ  nancing in the face of capital-account crises is thus impor-
tant not only to manage crises when they occur, but to prevent such crises and to avert contagion (Cordella 
and Yeyati, 2005; Griﬃ   th-Jones and Ocampo, 2003).
To address this obvious need, IMF has made eﬀ  orts in recent years to improve its lending policy 
during capital-account crises. In 1997, the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) was established. Th  e  evi-
dence that even countries with good macroeconomic fundamentals might be subject to sudden stops of ex-
ternal ﬁ  nancing also gave broad support to the idea that a precautionary ﬁ  nancial arrangement, closer to the 
lender-of-last-resort functions of central banks, had to be added to existing IMF facilities. In 1999, the IMF 
introduced the Contingent Credit Line (CCL). Th   e facility was never used and was discontinued in Novem-14  DESA Working Paper No. 39
ber 2003. Among the factors that may have contributed to the fact that countries failed to use it, observers 
have emphasized “entry” and “exit” problems (Buira, 2005). Contrary to what was desired, the potential use 
of the CCL was seen as an announcement of vulnerability that could harm conﬁ  dence. Another problem was 
that the country had to go to the IMF Executive Board to secure a loan.
Since the expiration of the CCL, the IMF has been exploring other ways to achieve its basic objec-
tives. As the IMF has recognized, the instant liquidity provided by a well-designed contingency line “would 
place a ceiling on rollover costs—thus avoiding debt crises triggered by unsustainable reﬁ  nancing rates, much 
in the same way as central banks operate in their role of lenders of last resort” (IMF, 2005b). Th  e  Medium 
Term Strategy of the IMF (2005a) thus includes a provision for a continued dialogue on a mechanism of 
contingency ﬁ  nancing. Based on proposals by the Managing Director of the IMF and approved by the In-
ternational Monetary and Financial Committee in April 2006, a ﬁ  rst proposal on a “Reserve Augmentation 
Line” (RAL) was put forward in August 2006. Th   is line would be 300 per cent of quota for one year, the full 
amount being available from the outset. It would require prequaliﬁ  cation, made at the country’s request, that 
would allow the country to use the resources automatically when needed (IMF, 2006). Automaticity is, of 
course, essential for pre-empting liquidity runs. Some developing countries have expressed that the RAL is a 
step forward, but that its design must be improved. Th  e  prequaliﬁ  cation process and the amount of resources 
available under this line are likely to draw considerable debate.
Th   e additional demand for IMF lending facilities that was evident during the succession of crises 
in the late 1990s implied that a signiﬁ  cant strengthening of the resource base of IMF might be needed, and 
that the potential loss to the global economy of failing to act was much higher than the opportunity costs of 
a larger Fund size (Kelkar, Chaudhry and Vanduzer-Snow, 2005). Even though the IMF has recently sharply 
reduced its lending to emerging economies, in the absence of capital account crises, it is very important to 
maintain or expand its lending capacity to help prevent future crises.
For compensating terms of trade shocks
Th   e provision of appropriate oﬃ   cial liquidity to avoid costly and unnecessary adjustment to temporary 
terms of trade shocks is also important, particularly for low-income countries, where these shocks have larger 
negative eﬀ  ects on growth and poverty (Collier and Pehn, 2001). Furthermore, low-income countries have 
limited room to build foreign exchange reserves as a buﬀ  er against such shocks.
Th   e IMF has facilities to compensate for terms of trade shocks, but they are far too limited and in 
some cases have become more so in recent years. Th   e major IMF facility designed in the 1960s to compen-
sate countries for terms of trade shocks, the Compensatory Financial Facility (CFF), has been used less and 
less, especially as its conditionality has been tightened. Indeed, since the modiﬁ  cation of the CFF in 2000, 
when upper tranche conditionality was introduced as a condition for its use, the CFF has not been used at 
all in spite of relevant shocks.
As regards low-income countries with access to the high conditional Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF), augmentation of such programmes has been the main vehicle used for countries hit by 
shocks. Th   is has the advantage of concessionality. However, it is linked to a highly conditional Fund arrange-
ment, inappropriate for shocks caused by external events. Secondly, as the IMF recognizes, PRGF augmen-
tation was very small compared to the impact of the shock and granted to only half the PRGF countries 
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In 2005 the IMF established a second concessional PRGF “window”, called the Exogenous Shocks 
Facility (ESF), for countries without a PRGF programme that experience shocks (which also include natural 
disasters). It is also, however, a high conditionality arrangement and its scale is again limited.
It seems, therefore, important that IMF facilities in these areas be modiﬁ  ed following two criteria. 
First, far lower conditionality should be attached to lending for externally caused shocks, whether for mid-
dle- or low-income countries. Indeed, the original CFF and the Oil Facilities had such low conditionality 
and were amply as well as eﬃ   ciently used. Th   is recognized the principle that countries should not adjust 
policies (if these are reasonable) when faced with purely exogenous and temporary shocks. Second, the scale 
of existing facilities, including the concessional component in the case of low-income countries, should be 
signiﬁ  cantly expanded, to compensate for a far larger proportion of temporary shocks. Th   is would reduce 
negative unnecessary eﬀ  ects on growth and poverty reduction.
A reason given for the small scale of PRGF augmentation and the ESF is the lack of concessional 
resources in the IMF. However, in a context of fairly rapid scaling up of aid ﬂ  ows, higher resources should be 
allocated to the IMF for ﬁ  nancing the subsidy element of such compensatory lending.
Macroeconomic cooperation among developing countries
Contrary to the rich historical experience in the area of development ﬁ  nancing, there is a dearth of experi-
ences in the area of macroeconomic cooperation in the developing world.4 However, several initiatives have 
been launched in recent years often aiming to replicate European arrangements. European macroeconomic 
cooperation emphasized building strong institutions and subordinated capital mobility to other objectives 
of regional macroeconomic cooperation, particularly real exchange rate stability to facilitate regional trade 
integration (Wyplosz, 2006). In the developing world, although intraregional trade links are weaker (though 
growing rapidly in some regions, particularly in East Asia), two additional rationales are present: building 
defences against global ﬁ  nancial shocks, and avoiding distorting competition among export-oriented econo-
mies (Sakakibara, 2003).
More than monetary unions—which in the developing world have been neither abundant nor suc-
cessful — the European experience has encouraged looser forms of macroeconomic dialogue among devel-
oping countries. Diﬀ  erent initiatives break up macroeconomic cooperation into its three basic components: 
macroeconomic policy dialogue and eventual policy consultation and surveillance; liquidity support dur-
ing crises; and exchange rate coordination (Ocampo, 2006). Th   e frequency of shocks faced by developing 
countries eliminate (or signiﬁ  cantly postpone) the desirability of the third component—which was the major 
objective of European macroeconomic cooperation.
Th  e  ﬁ  rst of these components of cooperation has been reﬂ  ected in the adoption of Maastricht-type 
criteria in the context of several integration processes in sub-Saharan Africa and in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. However, unless these criteria leads to regular surveillance and consultation processes that help 
internalize eﬀ  ects of macroeconomic policies on regional partners, their credibility and rationale may be 
totally lost. In the developing world, it is also necessary to strike a balance between targets and policy ﬂ  ex-
ibility, essential for economies subject to large shocks.
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Th   e experience of Latin America in this regard (Machinea and Rozenwurcel, 2006) indicates that, 
exchange of information and periodic technical meetings help build knowledge and mutual trust, the transi-
tion to more explicit coordination mechanisms is diﬃ   cult. Furthermore, a major incentive for policy coordi-
nation that was important in Europe, the ability to “borrow credibility” from neighbours, has been absent.
Th   e ASEAN Surveillance Process, adopted in 1998, is probably the most advanced of its kind. How-
ever, neither this mechanism nor the less structured ASEAN+3 mechanism (now integrated into the Chiang 
Mai Initiative) qualify as eﬀ  ective surveillance processes, due to the overemphasis on consensus and non-
interference in the peer review process.
Th   e second component of cooperation—liquidity support during crises — could provide an impor-
tant incentive for macroeconomic coordination among developing countries but has been widely underuti-
lized in the developing world. Th   e experience of the Latin American Reserve Fund demonstrates that even a 
modest fund can make essential contributions to the balance-of-payments ﬁ  nancing of developing countries 
(Titelman, 2006). Since 1978, this Fund provided such ﬁ  nancing to member States, equivalent to 60 per 
cent of that of IMF, beneﬁ  ting in particular its smallest members. Its ﬁ  nancing was clearly counter-cyclical, 
and its “preferred-creditor status” has been reﬂ  ected in its healthy portfolio, even in the face of two major 
crises. Furthermore, Agosin (2001) estimated that, during recent decades, even a relatively modest fund, 
equivalent to 15 per cent of Latin America’s international reserves, could have provided ﬁ  nancing to cope 
with capital outﬂ  ows equivalent to the entire short-term debts of all countries, except Mexico.
Th   e most ambitious project of this kind is the Chiang Mai Initiative, agreed upon in 2000 by 
ASEAN+3 (Park, 2006). Th   e agreed mechanism is the negotiation of bilateral swap arrangements among the 
central banks of the member countries, which added up to US$ 71.5 billion in February 2006. Aside from 
liquidity ﬁ  nancing, the mechanism has provided an instrument of policy dialogue and a surveillance mecha-
nism (which is deemed essential by net contributors, particularly Japan). Th   e mechanism entitles countries 
to an automatic disbursement of up to 20 per cent of the maximum amount of drawings, but beyond that 
a formal IMF programme is required. A modest step towards the multilateralization of bilateral swaps was 
taken in May 2005, when it was decided that the swap-activation process would be based on a collective 
decision-making process. Th   e mechanism has not yet been utilized and, indeed, the buoyant conditions of 
the member countries in recent years may have slowed down the pace of action.
Th   e recent decision to multilateralize the swap arrangement could lead to reserve pooling and even 
serve to back a common reserve currency. If a strong surveillance mechanism is put in place, ﬁ  nancing could 
be detached from an IMF program. In addition, the policy dialogue could also eventually evolve into a more 
formal system of policy coordination. Also, if the membership of the Initiative is expanded to include other 
countries (particularly India), the system could eventually evolve into a fully ﬂ  edged Asian monetary system 
(Rana, 2005). Th   is is more likely if the issue of Asian countries’ voice and participation in the IMF is not 
solved in an acceptable manner.A counter-cyclical framework for a development-friendly IFA          17
Conclusions
Volatility and contagion in international ﬁ  nancial markets increased incidence of ﬁ  nancial crises and growth 
volatility in the developing world, and reduced “policy space” to adopt counter-cyclical macroeconomic 
policies. Th   erefore, this paper argues that the major task of a development-friendly international ﬁ  nancial ar-
chitecture is to mitigate pro-cyclical eﬀ  ects of ﬁ  nancial markets and open “policy space” for counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies in the developing world.
To achieve these objectives, the paper explores a series of useful policy instruments: explicit in-
troduction of counter-cyclical criteria in the design of prudential regulatory and supervisory frameworks; 
designing market mechanisms that better distribute the risk faced by developing countries throughout the 
business cycle (GDP-indexed and local currency bonds); multilateral instruments that encourage more stable 
private ﬂ  ows, such as counter-cyclical guarantees; and better provision of counter-cyclical oﬃ   cial liquidity to 
deal with external shocks. It also suggests that some forms of macroeconomic cooperation among developing 
countries can play a role, particularly regional macroeconomic consultation, and common reserve funds or 
swap arrangements.
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